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Abstract
It is known that the set of all correlated equilibria of an n-player non-
cooperative game is a convex polytope and includes all the Nash equi-
libria. Further, the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of this poly-
tope. We study the geometry of both these equilibrium notions when
the players have cumulative prospect theoretic (CPT) preferences. The
set of CPT correlated equilibria includes all the CPT Nash equilibria but
it need not be a convex polytope. We show that it can, in fact, be dis-
connected. However, all the CPT Nash equilibria continue to lie on its
boundary. We also characterize the sets of CPT correlated equilibria
and CPT Nash equilibria for all 2× 2 games.
1 Introduction
Non-cooperative game theory studies the interaction between decision mak-
ers with possibly different objectives. In most cases, it is assumed that the
decision makers are rational. Rationality is generally formulated as expected
utility maximization. The justification for this comes from the von Neumann
andMorgenstern expected utility maximization theorem [Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 2007]. Although this assumption has a nice normative ap-
peal to it and can be used to a large extent as a prescriptive theory, it has
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been evident through several examples [Allais, 1953, Fishburn and Kochen-
berger, 1979, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] that the model is not that good
an approximation for descriptive purposes. On the other hand, cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) accommodates many empirically observed behavioral
features without losing much tractability [Tversky and Kahneman, 1992].
Two of the most well known notions of equilibrium, Nash equilibrium
[Nash, 1951] and correlated equilibrium [Aumann, 1974], are based on ex-
pected utility theory (EUT). Keskin [2016] defines analogs for both these
equilibrium notions based on cumulative prospect theory. He also establishes
the existence of such equilibria under certain continuity conditions.
There has been considerable interest in the study of the comparative ge-
ometry of Nash and correlated equilibria. Under EUT, it is known that the
set of all correlated equilibria is a convex polytope and contains the set of all
Nash equilibria. In the paper by Nau et al. [2004], it has been proved that:
the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the correlated equi-
librium polytope.
(P)
Further, it has been found that in 2-player (bimatrix) games, all extremal
Nash equilibria are also extremal correlated equilibria [Cripps, 1995, Canovas
et al., 1999, Evangelista and Raghavan, 1996], although this result does not
hold for more than 2 players [Nau et al., 2004]. The sets of correlated and
Nash equilibria have been completely characterized for 2× 2 games [Calvó-
Armengol et al., 2006].
Cumulative prospect theory is known to share common features with ex-
pected utility theory. The purpose of this paper is to study how the geometry
of equilibrium notions is affected by prospect theoretic preferences. For ex-
ample, under CPT, it continues to be the case that the set of correlated equi-
libria contains all Nash equilibria, but the set of correlated equilibria is not
guaranteed to be a convex polytope [Keskin, 2016, Example 2]. The pure
Nash equilibria, if they exist, coincide under EUT and CPT [Keskin, 2016,
Proposition 2]. It is known that the set of correlated equilibria under CPT
includes the set of joint probability distributions induced by the convex hull
of the set of pure Nash equilibria [Keskin, 2016, Proposition 3], as is true
under EUT.
These similarities and differences raise the natural question of whether
property (P) continues to hold or not under CPT. In fact, we will see that the
set of correlated equilibria can be disconnected (section 4). Nevertheless, our
main result says that property (P) continues to hold under CPT (section 2).
We also show that for 2× 2 games the set of correlated equilibria under CPT
is a convex polytope, and we characterize it (section 3).
2
2 Preliminaries and main result
Let Γ = (N, (Si)i∈N , (hi)i∈N ) be a finite n-person normal form game, where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, Si is the finite strategy set of player
i ∈ N , and hi : S1 × · · · × Sn → R is the payoff function for player i ∈ N .
Let each player i ∈ N have at least two strategies, i.e |Si| ≥ 2,∀i ∈ N . Let
the set of all joint strategies be denoted by S =
∏
i∈N Si. Let si ∈ Si denote
a pure strategy of player i ∈ N and let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S denote a joint
strategy of all players. Let S−i =
∏
j∈N\i Sj denote the set of joint strategies
s−i ∈ S−i of all players except player i. Let hi(s) denote the payoff of player i
when joint strategy s is played, and let hi(di, s−i) denote the payoff to player
i when she chooses strategy di ∈ Si while the others adhere to s.
Definition 2.1. The game Γ is non-trivial if hi(s) 6= hi(di, s−i) for some player
i ∈ N , some s ∈ S, and some di ∈ Si.
Consider a joint probability distribution µ on S, viewed as a vector in R|S|
with coordinates µ(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S, and satisfying ∑s∈S µ(s) = 1. Let
∆k denote the standard k-simplex,
∆k = {(p1, . . . , pk+1) ∈ Rk+1|p1 + · · ·+ pk+1 = 1, pi ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1},
with the usual topology.
Definition 2.2 (Aumann [1987]). A joint probability distribution µ ∈ ∆|S|−1
is said to be a correlated equilibrium of Γ if it satisfies the following inequal-
ities:∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(s)(hi(si, s−i)− hi(di, s−i)) ≥ 0, for all i and for all si, di ∈ Si.
(2.1)
The set of all correlated equilibria, henceforth denoted as CEUT , is a
convex polytope which is a proper subset of ∆|S|−1 iff the game is non-trivial.
The set I of all joint probability distributions that are of product form is
defined by a system of nonlinear constraints, viz.
I = {µ ∈ ∆|S|−1 : µ(s) = µ1(s1)× · · · × µn(sn) ∀ s ∈ S},
where µi denotes the marginal probability distribution on Si induced by µ.
The set of all Nash equilibria is the intersection of I and CEUT , which is
non-empty by virtue of Nash’s existence theorem.
We now give a quick review of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) [for
more details see Wakker, 2010]. Each person is associated with a reference
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point r ∈ R, a corresponding value function vr : R → R, and two probability
weighting functions w± : [0, 1] → [0, 1], w+ for gains and w− for losses. The
function vr(x) satisfies: (i) it is continuous in x; (ii) vr(r) = 0; (iii) it is
strictly increasing in x. The value function is generally assumed to be convex
in the losses frame (x < r) and concave in the gains frame (x > r), and is
steeper in the losses frame than in the gains frame in the sense that vr(r)−
vr(r−z) ≥ vr(r+z)−vr(r) for all z ≥ 0. The probability weighting functions
w± : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfy: (i) they are continuous; (ii) they are strictly
increasing; (iii) w±(0) = 0 and w±(1) = 1.
Suppose a person faces a lottery (or prospect)
L = {(p1, z1); . . . ; (pt, zt)},
where zj ∈ R, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, denotes an outcome and pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ t, is the proba-
bility with which outcome zj occurs. We assume the lottery to be exhaustive,
i.e.
∑t
j=1 pj = 1 (Note that we are allowed to have pj = 0 for some values of
j.) Let z = (z1, . . . , zt) and p = (p1 . . . , pt). We denote L as (p, z) and refer
to the vector z as an outcome profile.
Let a = (a1, . . . , at) be a permutation of (1, . . . , t) such that
za1 ≥ za2 ≥ · · · ≥ zat . (2.2)
Let 0 ≤ jr ≤ t be such that zaj ≥ r for 1 ≤ j ≤ jr and zaj < r for jr < j ≤ t.
(Here jr = 0 when zaj < r for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t.) The CPT value V r(L) of the
prospect L is evaluated using the value function vr(·) and the probability
weighting functions w±(·) as follows:
V r(L) :=
jr∑
j=1
pi+j (p, a)v
r(zaj ) +
t∑
j=jr+1
pi−j (p, a)v
r(zaj ), (2.3)
where pi+j (p, a), 1 ≤ j ≤ jr, pi−j (p, a), jr < j ≤ t, are decision weights defined
via:
pi+1 (p, a) = w
+(pa1),
pi+j (p, a) = w
+(pa1 + · · ·+ paj )− w+(pa1 + · · ·+ paj−1) for 1 < j ≤ t,
pi−j (p, a) = w
−(pat + · · ·+ paj )− w−(pat + · · ·+ paj+1) for 1 ≤ j < t,
pi−t (p, a) = w
−(pat).
Although the expression on the right in equation (2.3) depends on the per-
mutation a, one can check that the formula evaluates to the same value V r(L)
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as long as the permutation a satisfies (2.2). The CPT value in equation (2.3)
can equivalently be written as:
V r(L) =
jr−1∑
j=1
w+
(
j∑
i=1
paj
)[
vr(zaj )− vr(zaj+1)
]
+ w+
(
jr∑
i=1
paj
)
vr
(
zajr
)
+ w−
 t∑
i=jr+1
paj
 vr(zajr+1)
+
t−1∑
j=jr+1
w−
 t∑
i=j+1
paj
[vr(zaj+1)− vr(zaj )] . (2.4)
A person is said to have CPT preferences if, given a choice between prospect
L1 and prospect L2, she chooses the one with higher CPT value.
CPT satisfies strict stochastic dominance [Chateauneuf andWakker, 1999]:
shifting positive probability mass from an outcome to a strictly preferred out-
come leads to a strictly preferred prospect. For example, the prospect L1 =
{(0.6, 40); (0.4, 20)} can be obtained from the prospectL2 = {(0.5, 40); (0.5, 20)}
by shifting a probability mass of 0.1 from outcome 20 to a strictly better
outcome 40. The strict stochastic dominance condition says that V r(L1) >
V r(L2) (see equation (2.4)).
Also, CPT satisfies strict monotonicity [Chateauneuf and Wakker, 1999]:
any prospect becomes strictly better as soon as one of its outcomes is strictly
improved. For example, ifL1 = {(0.6, 40); (0.4,−10)} andL2 = {(0.6, 40); (0.4,−20)},
then V r(L1) > V r(L2) (see equation (2.3)).
We now describe the notion of correlated equilibrium incorporating CPT
preferences, as defined by Keskin [2016]. Let {vri (·), r ∈ R} be a family of
value functions, one for each reference point, and w±i (·) be the probability
weighting functions for each player i ∈ N . We assume that vri (x) is continu-
ous in x and r for each i. For every player i ∈ N , let the reference point be
determined by a continuous function ri : ∆|S|−1 → R. Let V ri (L) denote the
CPT value of a lottery L evaluated by player i, using the value function vri (·)
and probability weighting functions w±i (·).
For a joint distribution µ ∈ ∆|S|−1, let
µi(si) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(si, s−i)
be the marginal distribution of player i, and for si such that µi(si) > 0 let
µsi−i(s−i) =
µ(si, s−i)
µi(si)
5
be the conditional distribution on S−i.
If player i observes a signal to play si drawn from the joint distribution
µ, and if she decides to deviate to a strategy di ∈ Si, then she will face the
lottery
L(µ, si, di) :=
{(
µsi−i(s−i), hi(di, s−i)
)}
s−i∈S−i .
Definition 2.3 (Keskin [2016]). A joint probability distribution µ ∈ ∆|S|−1
is said to be a CPT correlated equilibrium of Γ if it satisfies the following
inequalities for all i and for all si, di ∈ Si such that µi(si) > 0:
V
ri(µ)
i (L(µ, si, si)) ≥ V ri(µ)i (L(µ, si, di)). (2.5)
For any fixed reference point r, since the value function vr(·) is assumed
to be strictly increasing, one can check that two outcome profiles x and y have
equal CPT value under all probability distributions p, i.e. V r(p, x) = V r(p, y)
for all p, iff x = y. It then follows that the set CCPT is a proper subset of
∆|S|−1 iff the game is non-trivial.
We now describe the notion of CPT Nash equilibrium as defined by Ke-
skin1 Keskin [2016]. For a mixed strategy µ ∈ I, if player i decides to play
si, drawn from the distribution µi, then she will face the lottery
L(µ−i, si) := {(µ−i(s−i), hi(si, s−i))}s−i∈S−i ,
where µ−i(s−i) =
∏
j 6=i µj(sj) plays the role of µ
si
−i(s−i), which does not
depend on si. Suppose player i decides to deviate and play a mixed strategy
µ′i while the rest of the players continue to play µ−i. Then define the average
CPT value for player i by
ACPTi (µ
′
i, µ−i) =
∑
si∈Si
µ′i(si)V
ri(µ)
i (L(µ−i, si)).
The best response of player i to a mixed strategy µ ∈ I is defined as
BRCPTi (µ) :=
{
µ∗i ∈ ∆|Si|−1|∀µ′i ∈ ∆|Si|−1, ACPTi (µ∗i , µ−i) ≥ ACPTi (µ′i, µ−i)
}
.
Definition 2.4 (Keskin [2016]). A mixed strategy µ∗ ∈ I, is a CPT Nash equi-
librium iff
µ∗i ∈ BRCPTi (µ∗) for all i.
We call µ∗ a pure or mixed CPT Nash equilibrium depending on µ∗ being a
pure or mixed strategy respectively.
1Keskin defines CPT equilibrium assuming w+(·) = w−(·). However, the definition can
be easily extended to our general setting and the proof of existence goes through without
difficulty.
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The set of all CPT correlated equilibria, henceforth denoted by CCPT , is
no longer guaranteed to be a convex polytope [Keskin, 2016, Example 2].
The set of all CPT Nash equilibria is the intersection of I and CCPT [Keskin,
2016, Proposition 1]) and is non-empty [Keskin, 2016, Theorem 1]. We are
interested in studying the geometry of this intersection. It should be noted
that the set CCPT depends on the choice of the reference functions ri(µ), as
does the set of CPT Nash equilibria.
In the case of traditional utility-theoretic equilibria, it has been proved
that
Proposition 2.5 (Nau et al. [2004]). In any finite, non-trivial game, the Nash
equilibria are on the boundary of the polytope of correlated equilibria when it
is viewed as a subset of the smallest affine space containing all joint probability
distributions.
Since the set of correlated equilibria CEUT is a convex polytope, it is
enough to prove that the Nash equilibria lie on one of the faces of CEUT if
CEUT is full-dimensional, i.e. has dimension |S| − 1, when it is viewed as
a subset of the affine space containing ∆|S|−1, and the statement is trivially
true if it is not full-dimensional. When the set CEUT is not full-dimensional,
it is possible for the Nash equilibria to lie in the relative interior of the set
CEUT [Nau et al., 2004, Proposition 2].
We now extend the above proposition for equilibria with CPT preferences.
The proof is quite different since in generalCCPT is not a convex polytope, as
shown in Example 4.2, Section 4 below [see also Keskin, 2016, Example 2].
Proposition 2.6. In any finite, non-trivial game, the CPT Nash equilibria are
on the boundary of the set of CPT correlated equilibria set when it is viewed as a
subset of the smallest affine space containing all joint probability distributions.
We first prove a lemma which in itself is an interesting property of cumu-
lative prospect theoretic preferences. Let V r(·) denote the CPT value evalu-
ated with respect to a value function vr(·) and probability weighting func-
tions w±(·) with respect to a reference point r ∈ R. Let x = (x1, . . . , xt) and
y = (y1, . . . , yt) be two outcome profiles and p = (p1, . . . , pt) be a probability
distribution. The prospect (p, x) is said to pointwise dominate the prospect
(p, y) if xj ≥ yj for all j such that pj > 0. Further, if the inequality xj ≥ yj
holds strictly for at least one j with pj > 0 then the prospect (p, x) is said to
strictly pointwise dominate the prospect (p, y). Let the regret corresponding
to choosing y instead of x be denoted by
Rr(p, x, y) := V r(p, x)− V r(p, y). (2.6)
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Prospects (p, x) and (p, y) are said to be similarly ranked if there exists a
permutation (a1, . . . , at′) of T ′ := {j ∈ {1, . . . , t}|pj > 0} such that
xa1 ≥ · · · ≥ xat′ and ya1 ≥ · · · ≥ yat′ .
Lemma 2.7. In the above setting, suppose the prospects (p, x) and (p, y) satisfy
either of the following:
(i) they are not similarly ranked or,
(ii) neither of them dominates the other,
then there exists a direction δ = (δ1, . . . , δt) with
∑t
j=1 δj = 0 and δj = 0 for
j /∈ T ′ such that
Rr(p+ δ, x, y) < Rr(p, x, y) (2.7)
for all r ∈ R, for all  > 0 such that p+ δ ∈ ∆t−1.
Proof. We observe that it is enough to prove the claim for the case when
pj > 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t because if not, then we can let x′, y′ and p′ be
respectively the vectors x, y and p restricted to the coordinates in T ′ and
then use the result. WLOG let the ordering be such that x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xt.
Let δ(j1, j2) correspond to transferring probability from j1 to j2, i.e. for all
1 ≤ j ≤ t,
δj(j1, j2) =

1 if j = j2,
−1 if j = j1,
0 otherwise .
Suppose (i) holds. Then there exists j1 < j2 (and hence xj1 ≥ xj2) such that
yj1 < yj2 . Now, by the strict stochastic dominance property of CPT we have
V r(p+ δ, x) ≤ V r(p, x) and V r(p, y) < V r(p+ δ, y),
where δ denotes δ(j1, j2), and hence (2.7) follows.
Now suppose (p, x) and (p, y) are similarly ranked. WLOG let the ordering
be such that x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xt and y1 ≥ · · · ≥ yt. Suppose (ii) holds. Then there
exist j1, j2 such that xj1 > yj1 and xj2 < yj2 . In fact, one can find j1, j2 such
that xj1 > yj1 , xj = yj for all j between j1 and j2, and xj2 < yj2 . Depending
on the order of j1 and j2 we have the following two cases (note j1 6= j2):
Case 1 (j1 < j2): Then we have the ordering xj2 < yj2 ≤ yj1 < xj1 . Let
δ = δ(j1, j2). Then it follows from the strict monotonicity of the functions
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w±i (·) and the definition of decision weights that
pi+j1(p+ δ)− pi+j1(p) < 0,
pi+j2(p+ δ)− pi+j2(p) > 0,
pi−j1(p+ δ)− pi−j1(p) < 0,
pi−j2(p+ δ)− pi−j2(p) > 0.
(We suppress the dependence of pi±j (p, a) on the permutation a since we have
assumed x and y to be ordered.) Depending on the position of the reference
point r, we have the following subcases:
Subcase 1a (r ≤ xj2):
[V r(p+ δ, x)− V r(p+ δ, y)]− [V r(p, x)− V r(p, y)]
= [pi+j1(p+ δ)− pi+j1(p)][vr(xj1)− vr(yj1)]
+ [pi+j2(p+ δ)− pi+j2(p)][vr(xj2)− vr(yj2)],
because pi+j (p + δ) = pi
+
j (p) for all j /∈ {j1, . . . , j2} and vr(xj) = vr(yj) for
all j1 < j < j2. Since vr(xj1)− vr(yj1) > 0 and vr(xj2)− vr(yj2) < 0 we get
(2.7).
Subcase 1b (xj2 < r ≤ yj2):
[V r(p+ δ, x)− V r(p+ δ, y)]− [V r(p, x)− V r(p, y)]
= [pi+j1(p+ δ)− pi+j1(p)][vr(xj1)− vr(yj1)] + [pi−j2(p+ δ)− pi−j2(p)]vr(xj2)
− [pi+j2(p+ δ)− pi+j2(p)]vr(yj2).
Now vr(xj1)− vr(yj1) > 0, vr(xj2) < 0, vr(yj2) > 0 and the result follows.
Subcase 1c (yj2 < r ≤ yj1):
[V r(p+ δ, x)− V r(p+ δ, y)]− [V r(p, x)− V r(p, y)]
= [pi+j1(p+ δ)− pi+j1(p)][vr(xj1)− vr(yj1)]
+ [pi−j2(p+ δ)− pi−j2(p)][vr(xj2)− vr(yj2)].
Now vr(xj1)− vr(yj1) > 0, vr(xj2)− vr(yj2) < 0 and the result follows.
Subcase 1d (yj1 < r ≤ xj1):
[V r(p+ δ, x)− V r(p+ δ, y)]− [V r(p, x)− V r(p, y)]
= [pi+j1(p+ δ)− pi+j1(p)]vr(xj1)− [pi−j1(p+ δ)− pi−j1(p)]vr(yj1)
+ [pi−j2(p+ δ)− pi−j2(p)][vr(xj2)− vr(yj2)].
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Now vr(xj1) > 0, v
r(yj1) < 0, v
r(xj2)− vr(yj2) < 0 and the result follows.
Subcase 1e (xji < r):
[V r(p+ δ, x)− V r(p+ δ, y)]− [V r(p, x)− V r(p, y)]
= [pi−j1(p+ δ)− pi−j1(p)][vr(xj1)− vr(yj1)]
+ [pi−j2(p+ δ)− pi−j2(p)][vr(xj2)− vr(yj2)].
Now vr(xj1)− vr(yj1) > 0, vr(xj2)− vr(yj2) < 0 and the result follows.
Case 2 (j1 > j2) implies the order yj1 < xj1 ≤ xj2 < yj2 . Taking δ =
δ(j2, j1), each of the subcases depending on the position of the reference
point can be handled as in case 1.
Remark 2.8. The vector δ used in the proof above depends only on the prospects
(p, x) and (p, y) and not on the reference point r. In fact, it depends only on
the order structure of the vectors x and y and not on the probability distri-
bution vector p as long as pj > 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t. Also, the range of  for
which the claim holds depends only on the prospects (p, x) and (p, y) and not
on the reference point r. Lemma 2.7 can be extended to more general CPT
settings as in Chateauneuf and Wakker [1999], where the outcome space is
assumed to be a connected topological space instead of monetary outcomes
in R.
Proof of proposition 2.6. If a CPTNash equilibrium µˆ is not completelymixed,
i.e. there is a player i and a strategy si ∈ Si, such that µˆi(si) = 0, then µˆ
assigns zero probability to one or more joint strategies and hence lies on the
boundary of ∆|S|−1 and thus also on the boundary of CCPT .
Suppose now that µˆ ∈ I ∩ CCPT is completely mixed. Then the inequal-
ities (2.5) hold for all i and for all si, di ∈ Si. In particular, for any pair
si, di ∈ Si we have
V
ri(µˆ)
i
({(
µˆsi−i(s−i), hi(si, s−i)
)}
s−i∈S−i
)
≥ V ri(µˆ)i
({(
µˆsi−i(s−i), hi(di, s−i)
)}
s−i∈S−i
)
,
V
ri(µˆ)
i
({(
µˆdi−i(s−i), hi(di, s−i)
)}
s−i∈S−i
)
≥ V ri(µˆ)i
({(
µˆdi−i(s−i), hi(si, s−i)
)}
s−i∈S−i
)
.
However, since µˆ ∈ I, we have µˆ−i := µˆsi−i = µˆdi−i and hence the above in-
equalities are in fact equalities. The same is true for all the inequalities (2.5).
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Since the game is non-trivial, there exist i ∈ N and si, di ∈ Si such that
hi(si, s−i) 6= hi(di, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S−i. Consider the inequality in (2.5)
corresponding to such an (i, si, di). Fix a one to one correspondence between
the numbers {1, . . . , t} and the joint strategies {s−i ∈ S−i} (here t = |S−i|).
Let
x := (x1, . . . , xt) = (hi(si, s−i))s−i∈S−i ,
and
y := (y1, . . . , yt) = (hi(di, s−i))s−i∈S−i .
Since µˆ is completely mixed, µˆi(si) > 0. Let
p = (p1, . . . , pt) = (µˆ−i(s−i))s−i∈S−i
be the conditional probability distribution on S−i.
If either profile (p, x) or (p, y) pointwise dominated the other then the
pointwise dominance would be strict since x and y are distinct and pj > 0
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t. By the strict monotonicity property of CPT, we would get
V ri(µˆ)(p, x) 6= V ri(µˆ)(p, y) contrary to our assumption. Thus condition (ii)
in Lemma 2.7 is satisfied and there exists a direction vector δ = (δ1, . . . , δt)
with
∑t
j=1 δj = 0 such that V
ri
i (p + δ, x) < V
ri
i (p + δ, y) for all ri ∈ R, for
all  > 0 such that p + δ ∈ ∆t−1. Note that the vector δ and the range of
 does not depend on the reference point ri (see remark 2.8). Consider the
joint probability distribution µ¯ given by
µ¯(ci, s−i) =
{
µˆi(si)(pj + δj) if ci = si and j corresponds to s−i ,
µˆ(ci, s−i) otherwise.
LetRri (·) denote the regret corresponding to player i, evaluated using her
value function and probability weighting functions. This should be thought
of as defined for any pair of outcome profiles x and y on S−i with a given
probability distribution p on S−i, as in equation (2.6), with V r being replaced
by V ri and defined as in equation (2.3), using the value function v
r
i and the
weighting functions w±i . Since µˆ ∈ I ∩ CCPT ,
R
ri(µˆ)
i (µˆ−i, x, y) = V
ri(µˆ)
i (p, x)− V ri(µˆ)i (p, y) = 0,
and
R
ri(µˆ)
i (µˆ−i, y, x) = V
ri(µˆ)
i (p, y)− V ri(µˆ)i (p, x) = 0.
respectively. Now if
R
ri(µ¯)
i (µˆ−i, x, y) ≤ Rri(µˆ)i (µˆ−i, x, y)
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then from the choice of µ¯
R
ri(µ¯)
i (µ¯
si
−i, x, y) = R
ri(µ¯)
i (p+δ, x, y) < R
ri(µ¯)
i (p, x, y) = R
ri(µ¯)
i (µˆ−i, x, y) ≤ 0.
On the other hand, if
R
ri(µ¯)
i (µˆ−i, x, y) > R
ri(µˆ)
i (µˆ−i, x, y) = 0
then
R
ri(µ¯)
i (µ¯
di
−i, y, x) = R
ri(µ¯)
i (µˆ−i, y, x) = −Rri(µ¯)i (µˆ−i, x, y) < 0.
Thus either of the inequalities in (2.5) corresponding to deviation from si to
di or di to si is violated by the joint distribution µ¯. Thus, for any neighborhood
N of µˆ, µ¯ belongs to N for sufficiently small  and µ¯ /∈ CCPT . Thus µˆ lies on
the boundary of CCPT .
3 2× 2 games
For a game Γ, the set CCPT , in general, need not be convex (example 2
in Keskin [2016]). In this section we will see that, in the special case of a
2 × 2 game with players having a fixed reference point independent of the
underlying probability distribution, CCPT is a convex polytope.
Consider a 2 player game Γ with N = {1, 2} and S1 = S2 = {0, 1}.
With player 1 as the row player and player 2 as the column player and
{aij , bij}i,j∈{0,1} representing payoffs for player 1 and 2 respectively, let the
payoff matrix be as shown in figure 1. Here, the real numbers aij and bij
should be thought of as outcomes in the terminology of cumulative prospect
theory, but wewill call them payoffs in this section. Let µ = {µ00, µ01, µ10, µ11} ∈
∆3 be a joint probability distribution assigning probabilities to joint strategies
as represented by the matrix in figure 1. Let r1 and r2 be the fixed reference
points (independent of the joint probability distribution µ) for players 1 and
2 respectively.
0 1
0 a00, b00 a01, b01
1 a10, b10 a11, b11
0 1
0 µ00 µ01
1 µ10 µ11
Figure 1: Payoff matrix (left) and joint probability matrix (right) of a 2 × 2
game
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Proposition 3.1. For the above 2× 2 game, the set CCPT is a convex polytope.
Proof. The condition for µ ∈ CCPT corresponding to the row player deviating
from strategy 0 to strategy 1 in (2.5) is:
if µ00 + µ01 > 0 then Rr11 (p
1, x, y) ≥ 0, (3.1)
where p1 = (p10, p
1
1), p
1
0 =
µ00
µ00+µ01
, p11 =
µ01
µ00+µ01
, x = (a00, a01), y =
(a10, a11). Let C1 denote the set of all µ ∈ ∆3 satisfying condition (3.1).
We have:
(i) if a00 ≥ a10 and a01 ≥ a11, then C1 = ∆3;
(ii) if a00 < a10 and a01 = a11 (resp. a00 = a10 and a01 < a11), then
C1 = {µ ∈ ∆3|µ00 = 0} (resp. C1 = {µ ∈ ∆3|µ01 = 0});
(iii) If a00 < a10 and a01 < a11, then C1 = {µ ∈ ∆3|µ00 = 0, µ01 = 0};
(iv) if a00 < a10 and a01 > a11 (resp. a00 > a10 and a01 < a11), then
from lemma 2.7, Rr11 (p
1, x, y) is strictly monotonic as a function of p10
(= 1− p11) on the interval (0, 1),
Rr11 ((0, 1), x, y) > 0 > R
r1
1 ((1, 0), x, y)
(resp. Rr11 ((0, 1), x, y) < 0 < R
r1
1 ((1, 0), x, y))),
and hence the inequality in condition (3.1) holds iff p10 ≤ q0 (resp. p11 ≤
q1) for a certain q0 ∈ (0, 1) (resp. q1 ∈ (0, 1)) depending on the payoffs
a00, a01, a10 and a11, the value function vr1(·), and the probability weight
functions w±1 (·). Thus C1 = {µ ∈ ∆3|α0µ00 ≤ µ01} with α0 = 1−q0q0
(resp. C1 = {µ ∈ ∆3|α1µ00 ≥ µ01} with α1 = q11−q1 ).
In each case,C1 is a convex polytope. Similarly, the other three conditions
in (2.5), corresponding to the row player deviating from strategy 1 to strategy
0, the column player deviating from strategy 0 to strategy 1, and the column
player deviating from strategy 1 to strategy 0, give rise to convex polytopes
C2, C3 and C4 respectively. The set CCPT is the (non-empty) intersection of
these convex polytopes and hence is itself a convex polytope.
Definition 3.2. For an n player game Γ = (N, (Si)i∈N , (hi)i∈N ), let si, di ∈ Si
be two strategies corresponding to player i.
• Strategies si and di are said to be equivalent if player i is indifferent in
choosing between si and di no matter what the other players do.
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• Strategy si is said to be weakly dominated by strategy di if there exists
at least one strategy profile of the opponents for which choosing di is
better than choosing si, and for all strategy profiles of the opponents
choosing di is at least as good as choosing si.
• Strategy si is said to be strictly dominated by strategy di if, for every
strategy profile of the opponents, choosing di is better than choosing
si.
Note that a strictly dominated strategy is also a weakly dominated strat-
egy.
As observed in section 2, two outcome profiles x and y are equivalent
under all probability distributions p iff x = y. Thus, as under EUT, for players
with CPT preferences we have the following:
• Strategy si is equivalent to strategy di iff
hi(si, s−i) = hi(di, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ S−i.
• Strategy si is weakly dominated by strategy di iff
hi(si, s−i) ≤ hi(di, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ S−i,
where strict inequality holds for at least one s−i ∈ S−i.
• Strategy si is strictly dominated by strategy di iff
hi(si, s−i) < hi(di, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ S−i.
We now look at the convex polytopeCCPT for a 2×2 game in more detail. We
first discuss 2× 2 games with no equivalent or weakly dominated strategies.
Let G0 denote the set of all such games. For any game Γ ∈ G0, the relation
amongst the payoffs for all the four conditions corresponding to C1, C2, C3
and C4 are as in case (iv) above. Further, the conditions corresponding to
the row player deviating from strategy 0 to strategy 1, and vice versa are
if µ00 + µ01 > 0 then V r11 (p
1, x) ≥ V r11 (p1, y); (3.2)
and
if µ10 + µ11 > 0 then V r11 (p
2, x) ≤ V r11 (p2, y); (3.3)
respectively, where p1 is as in proposition 3.1 and p2 = (p20, p
2
1), p
2
0 =
µ10
µ10+µ11
and p21 =
µ11
µ10+µ11
. Now there exists a q0 ∈ (0, 1) (or a q1 ∈ (0, 1)) such that
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inequality (3.2) holds for all p10 ≤ q0 (resp. p11 ≤ q1) and inequality (3.3)
holds for all p20 ≥ q0 (resp. p21 ≥ q1). Thus if C1 = {µ ∈ ∆3|α0µ00 ≤ µ01}
(resp. C1 = {µ ∈ ∆3|α1µ00 ≥ µ01}), then C2 = {µ ∈ ∆3|α0µ10 ≥ µ11} (resp.
C2 = {µ ∈ ∆3|α1µ10 ≤ µ11}). Similarly for player 2. Thus, depending on the
relation amongst the payoffs, the conditions (2.5) take one of the following
forms:
(I) if a00 > a10, a01 < a11, b00 > b01, b10 < b11 then
αµ00 ≥ µ01, αµ10 ≤ µ11, βµ00 ≥ µ10, βµ01 ≤ µ11;
(II) if a00 < a10, a01 > a11, b00 > b01, b10 < b11 then
αµ00 ≤ µ01, αµ10 ≥ µ11, βµ00 ≥ µ10, βµ01 ≤ µ11;
(III) if a00 > a10, a01 < a11, b00 < b01, b10 > b11 then
αµ00 ≥ µ01, αµ10 ≤ µ11, βµ00 ≤ µ10, βµ01 ≥ µ11;
(IV) if a00 < a10, a01 > a11, b00 < b01, b10 > b11 then
αµ00 ≤ µ01, αµ10 ≥ µ11, βµ00 ≤ µ10, βµ01 ≥ µ11;
for some α, β > 0. Thus every 2×2 game with no equivalent or weakly dom-
inated strategies can be classified into one of the above four types depending
on the relations amongst its payoffs.
We consider the canonical 2 × 2 games γl(α, β) for l ∈ {I, II, III, IV }
with α, β > 0 as shown in figure 2. One can check that the set CEUT for each
of these games is given by the corresponding inequalities above.
As in the paper by Calvó-Armengol et al. [2006], based on the type of
inequalities satisfied, we classify all 2×2 games, with no equivalent or weakly
dominated strategies, into three types:
• coordination games if the inequalities take form (I),
• anti-coordination games if the inequalities take form (IV) and,
• competitive games if the inequalities take either form (II) or form (III).
Since the inequalities above completely characterize the setCCPT , it is enough
to find the set CEUT for each of the canonical games. For case (II), we have
αµ00 ≤ µ01 ≤ µ11
β
and µ11 ≤ αµ10 ≤ βαµ00.
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0 1
0 α, β 0, 0
1 0, 0 1, 1
γI(α, β)
0 1
0 −α, β 0, 0
1 0, 0 −1, 1
γII(α, β)
0 1
0 α,−β 0, 0
1 0, 0 1,−1
γIII(α, β)
0 1
0 −α,−β 0, 0
1 0, 0 −1,−1
γIV (α, β)
Figure 2: Canonical 2× 2 games
µ µ00 µ01 µ10 µ11
µ∗A(α, β) 1 0 0 0
µ∗B(α, β) 0 0 0 1
µ∗C(α, β)
1
(1+α)(1+β)
α
(1+α)(1+β)
β
(1+α)(1+β)
αβ
(1+α)(1+β)
µ∗D(α, β)
1
1+β+αβ 0
β
1+β+αβ
αβ
1+β+αβ
µ∗E(α, β)
1
1+α+αβ
α
1+α+αβ 0
αβ
1+α+αβ
Figure 3: Vertices of the convex polytope CEUT for γI(α, β)
Thus all inequalities must be satisfied with equality and we get
µ00 =
1
(1 + α)(1 + β)
, µ01 =
α
(1 + α)(1 + β)
,
µ10 =
β
(1 + α)(1 + β)
, µ11 =
αβ
(1 + α)(1 + β)
. (3.4)
Case (III) is similar. Thus, for competitive games, the set CEUT is reduced to
a single point, which is also the unique mixed Nash equilibrium. For coor-
dination games, the set CEUT is a convex polytope with five vertices Calvó-
Armengol et al. [2006] (figure 3). It intersects the set I at the three vertices
µ∗A(α, β), µ
∗
B(α, β) and µ
∗
C(α, β) of which the first two are pure Nash equi-
libria. From the set of inequalities corresponding to cases (I) and (IV) we
can see that the joint distribution µ = (µ00, µ01, µ10, µ11) belongs to CEUT of
γI(α, β) iff τ(µ) := (µ10, µ11, µ00, µ01) belongs to CEUT of γIV (α, 1/β) Calvó-
Armengol et al. [2006]. Thus, for anti-coordination games, the set CEUT is
again a convex polytope with five vertices and it intersects I at three of its
vertices with two of them pure Nash equilibria. The vertices can be found
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from figure 3, using the transformation τ , and replacing β by 1/β. Since
CCPT is determined by the same set of inequalities in α and β, all the re-
sults carry over to 2 × 2 games with CPT preferences. In particular, the set
CCPT is determined by α and β. Since the set of CPT Nash equilibria (pure
and mixed) is given by the intersection of I and CCPT , we have a unique
mixed CPT Nash equilibrium and no pure CPT Nash equilibria for competi-
tive games, and onemixed and two pure CPTNash equilibria for coordination
and anti-coordination games.
Consider now a 2× 2 game with at least one strictly dominated strategy.
This corresponds to case (i) above with both inequalities strict (i.e. a00 > a10
and a01 > a11) or case (iii). Strictly dominated strategies cannot be used
with positive probability in any correlated equilibrium of that game. It is
easy then to compute the setCCPT for such a game by eliminating the strictly
dominated strategies. Suppose strategy 1 is strictly dominated by strategy 0.
Thus, a00 > a10 and a01 > a11. If b00 > b01 then CCPT = {µ ∈ ∆3|µ01 =
µ10 = µ11 = 0} is a point. If b00 < b01 then CCPT = {µ ∈ ∆3|µ00 = µ10 =
µ11 = 0} is a point. If b00 = b01 then CCPT = {µ ∈ ∆3|µ10 = µ11 = 0} is a
line segment. In each case CCPT is containedin I. The case when strategy 0
is strictly dominated by strategy 1 is similar.
LetG1 denote the set of all 2×2 gameswith at least oneweakly dominated
strategy but no equivalent or strictly dominated strategy. If player 1 has
a weakly dominated strategy then this corresponds to case (i) above with
one equality and one strict inequality (i.e. a00 > a10 and a01 = a11, or
a00 = a10 and a01 > a11), or case (ii). The set of all 2 × 2 games, each
game characterized by its payoff matrix, forms an 8-dimensional Euclidean
vector space. Every game Γ ∈ G1 can be seen as a limit of games in G0 of
a unique type. For example, a game Γ ∈ G1 with payoffs satisfying a00 <
a10, a01 = a11, b00 > b01, b10 < b11 is the limit, as  ↓ 0, of games Γ ∈ G0
with payoffs same as that of Γ except a01 replaced by a01 + . Each of the
games Γ is of type (II) for sufficiently small  > 0. Further, if γII(α, β)
are the canonical games corresponding to Γ then α → ∞ and β = β for
some fixed β. Using this observation we classify every game Γ ∈ G1 into
four types l ∈ {I, II, III, IV } and each of these 4 types into eight further
subtypes depending on the limit of α and β going either to 0,∞ or some real
number in (0,∞) with at least one of them tending to 0 or∞. The set CCPT
for games of the type (I) and (II) are given in figures 4 and 5 respectively.
The set CCPT for types (IV) and (III) can be found using the transformation
τ and replacing β by 1/β (with the convention 1/0 =∞ and 1/∞ = 0) from
figures 4 and 5 respectively.
The geometry of CCPT in case (I) is as follows:
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β = 0 0 < β <∞ β =∞
α = 0 µ01 = 0 µ01 = 0 µ01 = 0
µ10 = 0 βµ00 ≥ µ10
0 < α <∞ µ10 = 0 − µ01 = 0
αµ00 ≥ µ01 αµ10 ≤ µ11
α =∞ µ10 = 0 µ10 = 0 µ01 = 0
βµ01 ≤ µ11 µ10 = 0
Figure 4: The set CCPT for games of type (I) with weakly dominated strate-
gies
β = 0 0 < β <∞ β =∞
α = 0 µ11 = 0 µ11 = µ01 = 0 µ11 = 0
µ10 = 0 βµ00 ≥ µ10 µ01 = 0
0 < α <∞ µ11 = µ10 = 0 − µ01 = µ00 = 0
αµ00 ≤ µ01 αµ10 ≥ µ11
α =∞ µ10 = 0 µ00 = µ10 = 0 µ00 = 0
µ00 = 0 βµ01 ≤ µ11 µ01 = 0
Figure 5: The set CCPT for games of type (II) with weakly dominated strate-
gies
• If α = β = 0 or α = β = ∞, then CCPT is a line with endpoints
F = (1, 0, 0, 0) and G = (0, 0, 0, 1). It intersects the set I at the two
endpoints F and G.
• If α = 0, β = ∞, then CCPT is a triangle with vertices F = (1, 0, 0, 0),
G = (0, 0, 1, 0), and H = (0, 0, 0, 1). It intersects I at the lines with
endpoints {F,G} and {G,H}. Similarly, if α = ∞, β = 0, then CCPT
is a triangle and it intersects I at two lines.
• If α = 0, 0 < β < ∞, then CCPT is a triangle with vertices F =
(0, 0, 0, 1), G = (1, 0, 0, 0), and H = ( 11+β , 0,
β
1+β , 0). It intersects the
set I at the point (0, 0, 0, 1) and the line joining the points (1, 0, 0, 0) and
( 11+β , 0,
β
1+β , 0). The remaining three cases can be analyzed similarly.
The geometry of CCPT in case (II) is as follows:
• If α = β = 0, then the set CCPT is a line joining the points (1, 0, 0, 0)
and (0, 1, 0, 0) contained in the set I. Similarly, for the cases when
α = 0 or∞ and β = 0 or∞, the set CCPT is a line segment contained
in the set I.
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• If α = 0, 0 < β < ∞, then CCPT is a line joining the points (1, 0, 0, 0)
and ( 11+β , 0,
β
1+β , 0) and is contained in the set I. The remaining three
cases can be analyzed similarly.
The geometry of CCPT is cases (IV) and (III) can be obtained from cases (I)
and (II) respectively, using the transformation τ , and replacing β by 1/β.
We now consider a 2× 2 game with at least one equivalent pair of strate-
gies. Suppose player 1 has equivalent strategies. This corresponds to case
(i) above with both equalities (i.e. a00 = a10 and a01 = a10). Thus player 1
is indifferent between his strategies. For player 2, if the two strategies are
equivalent, then the game is trivial and CCPT = ∆3. If one of the strate-
gies for player 2 is weakly dominated, say strategy 0 is weakly dominated
by strategy 1, then either b00 = b01, b10 < b11 or b00 < b01, b10 = b11. If
b00 = b01, b10 < b11, then the set CCPT = {µ ∈ ∆3|µ10 = 0} is a triangle with
vertices F = (1, 0, 0, 0), G = (0, 1, 0, 0) and H = (0, 0, 0, 1). It intersects the
set I at the lines with endpoints {F,G} and {G,H}. The other three cases
are similar. If neither of the two strategies for player 2 dominates the other,
then CCPT is characterized by the inequalities
{βµ00 ≥ µ10, βµ01 ≤ µ11} or {βµ00 ≤ µ10, βµ01 ≥ µ11}.
where the former pair holds if b00 > b01, b10 < b11 and the latter holds if
b00 < b01, b10 > b11. Suppose the first pair of inequalities hold (the other
case can be handled similarly). Then one can check that the set CCPT is a
tetrahedronwith verticesE = (1, 0, 0, 0), F = ( 11+β , 0,
β
1+β , 0), G = (0, 0, 0, 1)
and H = (0, 11+β , 0,
β
1+β ). It intersects I at the lines with endpoints {E,F},
{G,H} and {F,H}.
4 Connectedness of CCPT
In the previous section, we saw that for 2×2 games the set CCPT is a convex
polytope. However, in general, the set CCPT can have a more complicated
geometry. We will now see that the set CCPT can, in fact, be disconnected.
In this section, we restrict our attention to games with each player i hav-
ing reference point ri = 0, and all the outcomes hi(·) non-negative. Thus all
our outcome profiles are “one-sided” with zero reference point, and we will
denote w+i (·), v0i (·), V ri (·) simply by wi(·), vi(·), Vi(·) respectively.
The geometry of the setCCPT is determined by the set of inequalities (2.5).
Let us consider the inequality corresponding to player i deviating from strat-
egy si to di. For ease of notation, fix a one to one correspondence between
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the numbers {1, . . . , t} and the joint strategies {s−i ∈ S−i} (here t = |S−i|).
Let
x = (x1, . . . , xt) := (vi(hi(si, s−i)))s−i∈S−i ,
and
y = (y1, . . . , yt) := (vi(hi(di, s−i)))s−i∈S−i .
Let p = (p1, . . . , pt) ∈ ∆t−1 be a joint probability distribution on S−i. Let
(a1, . . . , at) and (b1, . . . , bt) be permutations of (1, . . . , t) such that
xa1 ≥ xa2 ≥ · · · ≥ xat and yb1 ≥ yb2 ≥ · · · ≥ ybt ,
respectively.
Consider the inequality
V˜i(p, x) ≥ V˜i(p, y), (4.1)
where
V˜i(p, x) = xat + wi(pa1 + · · ·+ pat−1)[xat−1 − xat ]
+ wi(pa1 + · · ·+ pat−2)[xat−2 − xat−1 ] + · · ·+ wi(pa1)[xa1 − xa2 ],
(4.2)
and
V˜i(p, y) = ybt + wi(pb1 + · · ·+ pbt−1)[ybt−1 − ybt ]
+ wi(pb1 + · · ·+ pbt−2)[ybt−2 − ybt−1 ] + · · ·+ wi(pb1)[yb1 − yb2 ].
(4.3)
To contrast with the notation used in earlier sections, note that V˜i(p, x) =
Vi(p, x˜) and V˜i(p, y) = Vi(p, y˜), where x˜ := (hi(si, s−i))s−i∈S−i and y˜ :=
(hi(di, s−i))s−i∈S−i . Let C(i, si, di) denote the set of all probability vectors
p ∈ ∆t−1 that satisfy the inequality (4.1). We can similarly define C(i, si, di)
for all i ∈ N, si, di ∈ Si. It is clear from the definition of CPT correlated
equilibrium that for a joint probability distribution µ ∈ CCPT , provided
µi(si) > 0, the probability vector p = µ
si
−i ∈ ∆t−1 should belong toC(i, si, di)
for all di ∈ Si. Let
C(i, si) := ∩di∈SiC(i, si, di).
Now, for all i, define a subset C(i) ⊂ ∆|S|−1, as follows:
C(i) := {µ ∈ ∆|S|−1|µsi−i ∈ C(i, si),∀si ∈ Si such that µi(si) > 0}.
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Note that since CCPT is nonempty, the set C(i) is nonempty for each i. The
set C(i) can be constructed from the sets {C(i, si), si ∈ Si} as follows: let
psi ∈ C(i, si) for all si ∈ Si such that C(i, si) 6= φ, let qi ∈ ∆|Si|−1 be
a probability distribution over Si such that qi(si) = 0 for all si ∈ Si such
that C(i, si) = ∅, and define a joint probability distribution µ ∈ ∆|S|−1 by
µ(si, s−i) = qi(si)psi(s−i) if C(i, si) 6= φ and µ(si, s−i) = 0 otherwise. Then
µ ∈ C(i), and for every µ ∈ C(i), the corresponding qi = µi for all si ∈ Si
and psi = µsi−i for all si ∈ Si with C(i, si) 6= φ. Further, it is clear that
CCPT = ∩i∈NC(i).
Thus the set CCPT is uniquely determined by the collection of sets
{C(i, si, di), i ∈ N, si, di ∈ Si}.
Lemma 4.1. In the above setting, the set C(i, si, di) is connected.
Proof. Suppose the permutations (a1, . . . , at) and (b1, . . . , bt) can be chosen
such that they are equal. Let
lj := wi(
j∑
k=1
pak) = wi(
j∑
k=1
pbk), for 1 ≤ j ≤ t. (4.4)
For every vector l = (l1, . . . , lt) ∈ Rt such that 0 ≤ l1 ≤ · · · ≤ lt = 1,
there corresponds a unique probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pt) satisfying
equations (4.4) and this mapping is continuous because wi(·) is a contin-
uous strictly increasing function. Thus we have a one-to-one correspondence
between probability vectors (p1, . . . , pt) and the vectors (l1, . . . , lt).
Inequality (4.1) can then be written as
ltxat +
t−1∑
i=1
lt−i[xat−i − xat−i+1 ] ≥ ltybt +
t−1∑
i=1
lt−i[ybt−i − ybt−i+1 ]. (4.5)
Since this is linear in (l1, . . . , lt), the set of all vectors (l1, . . . , lt) satisfying
inequality (4.5) is a convex polytope. In particular, it is connected. Thus the
set C(i, si, di) is also connected.
Suppose now the permutations (a1, . . . , at) and (b1, . . . , bt) cannot be cho-
sen to be equal. Then there exists 1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ t such that xj1 > xj2 and
yj1 ≤ yj2 . If p ∈ C(i, si, di) such that pj2 > 0, then, by the stochastic domi-
nance property, the following probability vector q(), for all 0 ≤  ≤ 1, also
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belongs to C(i, si, di):
qj() =

pj1 + (1− )pj2 if j = j1,
pj2 if j = j2,
pj otherwise.
Thus, from every vector p ∈ C(i, si, di), we have a path connecting it to a
probability vector p′ ∈ C(i, si, di) such that p′j2 = 0. To show that C(i, si, di)
is connected it is enough to show that the subset
C ′(i, si, di) = {p′ ∈ C(i, si, di)|p′j2 = 0}.
is connected. From (4.2) and (4.3), we can see that the CPT values of the
prospects (p, x) and (p, y) with probability vector restricted to C ′(i, si, di) do
not depend on the outcomes xj2 and yj2 . If one can now choose permutations
(a′1, . . . , a′t−1) and (b′2, . . . , b′t−1) of {1, . . . , t}\{j2} such that
xa′1 ≥ xa′2 ≥ · · · ≥ xa′t−1 and yb′1 ≥ yb′2 ≥ · · · ≥ yb′t−1 ,
then, as before, one can argue that the set C ′(i, si, di) is connected. If not,
we can continue to decrease the support of the probability vectors under
consideration. This process terminates since our state space is finite.
Even though the sets C(i, si, di) are connected, their intersection might
be disconnected, as in example 4.2.
Example 4.2. Consider a 2 player game with each player having three pure
strategies: TOP, CENTER, BOTTOM for player 1 (row player) and RED, YEL-
LOW, GREEN for player 2 (column player), with the corresponding payoffs
as shown in table 1. For both the players, let vi(·) be the identity function.
For the probability weight function wi(·) we employ the function suggested
by Prelec [1998], which, for i = 1, 2, is given by
wi(p) = exp{−(− ln p)αi},
for some αi ∈ (0, 1]. We take α1 = 0.5 and α2 = 1. We will now see
that the set C(1,TOP) is disconnected. Fix the correspondence (R, Y,G) ↔
(RED, YELLOW, GREEN). The set C(1,TOP,BOTTOM) consists of all proba-
bility vectors p = (pR, pY , pG) ∈ ∆2 satisfying the following inequality:
20 + w1(pR + pY )[61− 20] + w1(pR)[69− 61]
≥ 0 + w1(pR + pY )[41− 0] + w1(pR)[101− 41].
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RED YELLOW GREEN
TOP 69, 10 61, 0 20, 10
CENTER 50, 0 60, 10 30, 0
BOTTOM 101, 0 41, 10 0, 0
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the game in example 4.2
This holds iff pR ≤ 0.40 (all the decimal numbers henceforth are correct up
to two decimal points). Thus, we have
C(1,TOP,BOTTOM) = {p ∈ ∆2|pR ≤ 0.40}.
The setC(1,TOP,CENTER) consists of all probability vectors p = (pR, pY , pG) ∈
∆2 satisfying the inequality
20 + w1(pR + pY )[61− 20] + w1(pR)[69− 61]
≥ 30 + w1(pR + pY )[50− 30] + w1(pY )[60− 50].
Rearranging, we get
21w1(1− pG)− 10w1(1− pR − pG) ≥ 10− 8w1(pR).
For each pR ∈ [0, 0.4], we solve the above inequality for pG. The setC(1,TOP),
as shown in figure 6, is disconnected. One can check that
(0, , 1− ) ∈ C(1,CENTER) and (1− , , 0) ∈ C(1,BOTTOM),
for  ∈ [0, 0.20]. We cannot as yet conclude that the set C(1) is disconnected,
because of the existence of joint probability distributions µ with marginal
distribution µ1(TOP) = 0. We now show that C(2) cannot contain any dis-
tribution µ with µ1(TOP) = 0.
Fix the correspondence (T,C,B)↔ (TOP,CENTER,BOTTOM). A similar
analysis for player 2 shows that
C(2,RED) = {p ∈ ∆2|pT ≥ 0.5},
C(2,YELLOW) = {p ∈ ∆2|pT ≤ 0.5},
C(2,GREEN) = {p ∈ ∆2|pT ≥ 0.5}.
Suppose that there were µ ∈ CCPT with µ1(TOP) = 0. Then
µ(TOP,RED) = µ(TOP,YELLOW) = µ(TOP,GREEN) = 0,
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(1, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1)
pR = 0.40
Figure 6: Standard 2-simplex of probability vectors p = (pR, pY , pG). The
shaded region represents the set C(1,TOP) and is disconnected.
and from the structure of the sets C(2,RED) and C(2,GREEN) we get
µ2(RED) = µ2(GREEN) = 0.
Thus, the joint probability µ has support only on the strategy pairs (CEN-
TER,YELLOW) and (BOTTOM,YELLOW). Thus, player 2 always plays strat-
egy YELLOW and player 1 mixes between CENTER and BOTTOM. However,
given player 2 plays strategy YELLOW, player 1’s TOP strategy dominates
strategies CENTER and BOTTOM. Hence such a joint probability distribu-
tion is not possible. Thus there does not exist any distribution µ ∈ CCPT
with µ1(TOP) = 0.
There is a possibility that one of the components of C(1,TOP) could dis-
appear in the intersection C(1) ∩ C(2). However, this does not happen be-
cause both the distributions µ¯, µ˜ in figure 7 belong to CCPT with µ¯TOP−1 and
µ˜TOP−1 belonging to different components of C(1,TOP).
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RED YELLOW GREEN
TOP 0.4 0.1 0.5
CENTER 0 0.05 0.5
BOTTOM 0.4 0.05 0
RED YELLOW GREEN
TOP 0.4 0 0.6
CENTER 0 0 0.6
BOTTOM 0.4 0 0
Figure 7: Un-normalized distributions µ¯ and µ˜.
5 Conclusions and future work
Although the set of correlated equilibria under CPT has a more complicated
geometry than a convex polytope, property (P), on the intersection of the
Nash and correlated equilibrium sets, continues to hold. Property (P) is par-
ticularly relevant to the interactive learning problem in game theory [Foster
and Vohra, 1997, Foster and Young, 2006, Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000]. This
raises the question of analyzing the interactive learning problem under cu-
mulative prospect theoretic preferences. We leave this for future work.
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